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ELMA ARLENE RAMMELL, : 
Petitioner-Appellant 
vs. : 
SAMUEL SMITH, Warden : Case No. 14618 
Utah State Prison, 
Defendant-Respondent : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Elma Arlene Rammell, appeals the dismissal 
of her petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT] 
The appellant, Elma Arlene Rammell, filed a petition for 
a Writ of Habeas Corpus in Third District Court. The matter came 
on for hearing of the Respondent's motion to dismiss before the 
Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., District Court Judge on Thursday, 
April 29, 1976. The Respondent's motion was granted following 
argument by opposing counsel, and the Writ was dismissed with 
prejudice. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the Order of Dismissal 
rendered below and a remand to the Third Judicial District Court 
for a new hearing on the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Writ of Habeas Corpus in this case petitions for relief 
from findings of Guilty by reason of pleas of guilty in two separate 
cases in Third District Court for the State of Utah. The charge 
in both instances was that of obtaining a controlled substance by 
fraud and misrepresentation in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§58-37-8 (4)(ii) (1953 as amended). 
The appellant entered a plea of guiltjr to the first charge 
under the aforementioned section on the 9th day of March, 1973 
before the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr. On the 6th day of April, 
1973 Judge Baldwin committed the complainant to prison for a term 
not to exceed five years. The complainant served approximately 
26 months and on the 102 day of June, 1975 the defendant was released 
on parole. 
The defendant was subsequently rearrested on the 23rd day 
of October, 1975 and charged again with violation of Title 59 
Chapter 37, Section 8(4)(ii) Utah Code Annotated by obtaining 
a controlled substance, to-wit;: Dalmone and Phenaphen by misrepresent-
ation, fraud and disception. On the 6th day of January, 1976 the 
defendant entered a plea of guilty before the Honorable Gordon R. Hall 
and on the 20th day of January, 1976 the defendant was sentenced 
to a term not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
Subsequent to the entry of the second plea of guilty, the defendant's 
parole was revoked on the first charge and she now resides in the 
Utah State Prison under committments from the Utah State Parole 
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Board and from Judge Hall of the Third District; Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
On the 8th day of March, 1976, the Petitioner filed in 
Third District in connection with the second case a Motion requesting 
Vacation of Sentence. The requested relief was resentencing under 
Utah Code Ann. §58-17-14.13 (1953 as amended) to a maximum of one 
year to be served in the Salt Lake County Jail. That motion was 
denied by the Honorable Gordon R. Hall for lack of jurisdiction. 
On the 27th day of May the appellant filed a Petition 
for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, which came on for hearing on the 
respondent's motion to dismiss on April 29, 19716. 
ARGUMENT OF POINTS OF LAW 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT RELIEF FROM 
A SENTENCE IMPOSED UNDER THE GREATER OF TWO PENALTY 
PROVISIONS PASSED SIMULTANEOUSLY BY THE LEGISLATURE. 
The petitioner was convicted by plea of uttering a forged 
prescription to obtain the drugs Dalmone and Phenaphen. The 
defendant's act clearly falls within the ambit of the Pharmacy Act, 
Utah Code Ann. 58-17-14.13 (1953 as amended), which states in 
pertinent part: 
No person shall obtain or possess or attempt to possess, any 
drug or medicine intended for use by man which, under the 
laws of this state or the laws of the United States or 
lawful regulations thereunder, has been designed as unsafe 
for use except under the supervision of a practitioner 
licensed to administer or prescribe such drugs or medicines: 
(1) by fraud, deceit, misrepresentation or subterfuge . . . 
The penalty for this offense is set forth in Utah'Code 
Ann. §58-17-26 (1953 as amended) which specifically states that: 
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Any person who violates sections . . . 58-17-14.13, shall 
be punished by a fine of not more than $1,000 or imprisonment 
in the county jail for not more than one (1) year or 
both.l 
It is important to note that this penalty provision was 
amended and increased by the legislature in 1971. Prior to 1971, 
a violation of Section 58-17-14.13 was punishable as a simple 
misdemeanor with a maximum of six (6) months in the county jail and 
a fine of $299, or both. 
That same legislature, during the same session, passed the 
"Utah Controlled Substance Act'" which created the problem that faces 
the Court in this case. The act of defendant in misrepresentation 
fraud and deception to obtain the drugs Dalmone and Phenaphen 
also constitutes a violation of Section 58-37-8(4)(a)(iii) of the 
Utah Controlled Substance Act which states: 
It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly and 
intentionally . . . (ii) to acquire or obtain possession 
or the administration of a controlled substance by 
misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, deception or 
subterfuge. 
The penalty for a violation of the above section is set 
forth in Section 58-37-8(4)(b) Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), 
which provides for imprisonment of not more than five years or a 
2 
fine of not more than $5,000 or both. 
1. A Class A Misdemeanor under Utah Code Ann. §§76-3-204(1) and 
76-3-301(3) (Supp. 1975). 
2. A Third Degree Felony under Utah'Code Ann. §§76-3-203(3) and 
76-3-301(2) (Supp. 1975). 
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Since the penalty for defendants act falls within conflicting 
provisions of two (2) acts passed in the same legislative session, 
the determination of the proper penalty should be made within the 
guidelines set out by the court in State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 
343, 453 P.2d 146 (1969) and followed in State v. Fair, 23 Utah 2d 
34, 456 P.2d 168 (1969) . 
The Shondel case involved an overlap of the Drug Abuse Control 
Law and the Narcotic Drug Act which were both enacted during the 
same session of the 1967 Legislature of Utah. Shondel was charged 
with possession of the drug LSD. The Drug Abuse Control Law provided 
a misdemeanor penalty for that offense, while the Narcotic Drug 
Act made it a felony. On appeal the court held that Shondel was 
entitled to the lesser of the two penalties. In writing the opinion 
of the Supreme Court Chief Justice Crockett based his rationale 
upon the principle of equal protection of law and the principle that 
a penal statute "should be sufficiently certain that persons with 
ordinary intelligence who desire to obey the law may know how to 
conduct themselves in conformity with it.'1 22 ptah 2d at 356, 
453 P.2d at 148. 
Section 58-37-19 of the Controlled Substance Act states in 
its pertinent part: 
. . . whenever the . . . penalties imposed relating to 
substances controlled by this act shall be or appear 
to be in conflict with Title 58, Chapter 17 or may other 
laws of this state, the provision of this act shall be 
controlling. 
It may be argued that this provision constitutes a clear 
legislative mandate compelling the prosecutor and trial court to proceed 
against defendant by imposing the felony penalty. This argument 
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overlooks the details of the fact situation faced by the Supreme 
Court in Shondel. 
In Shondel it was argued that the felony penalty of the 
Narcotic Drug Act should prevail because of a section in the Drug 
Abuse Control Law which provided that: 
Notwithstanding the other provisions of the act, whenever 
the possession sale, transfer, or dispensing of any drug 
or substance would constitute an offense under this act 
and also constitutes an offense under the laws of this state 
relating to the possession, sale, transfer, or dispensing of 
narcotic drugs or marijuana, such offense shall not be 
punishable under this act but shall be punishable under such 
other provision of law. 
In Shondel, the Supreme Court refused to accept the argument 
that the proceeding quoted provision cured the overlap problem 
of the two legislative acts being considered. The reasoning set 
out in the opinion of the Supreme Court was that the "reference 
to such other provisions of the law" leaves one concerned with 
compliance with the law to search elsewhere to discover whether 
some "other provision of law1 . . . prescribed some other penalty." 
22 Utah at 346, 453 P.2d at 147, 148. 
In the instant case, this reasoning applies with even greater 
force. The citizen concerned with an understanding of the law is 
not even sent "searching" as was the case with the overlap involved 
in Shondel. The legislature of 1971 increased the penalty for a 
violation of Section 58-17-14.13 of the Pharmacy Act, and in the 
same session passed the Controlled Substance Act. Yet, nowhere in 
the Pharmacy Act is reference made to the fact that another law 
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has been enacted to supercede Section 58-17-14.13 which ostensibly 
remains in effect with more force than it previously had. 
It may now be seen how truly analogous the Shondel and Fair 
cases are. The penalties at issue in this case were enacted in the 
same legislative session. Defendants conduct falls squarely within 
the terms of Section 58-17-14.13 of the Pharmacy Act. Imposition 
of the more severe penalty found in the Controlled Substance Act 
is repugnant to equal protection of law and the principle that the 
law should provided reasonably clear notice of the sanctions 
annexed to the commission of a given act. 
If there is any distinction between Shondel and the instant 
case it is that the Pharmacy Act now being considered does not 
even send a researcher "searching" for conflicting provisions 
located elsewhere in the Code. The reasoning of the Court in 
Shondel therefore applies a fortiori in the instant case. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONER 
SHOULD HAVE SOUGHT HER REMEDY BY APPEAL AND WAS NOT 
ENTITLED TO CONSIDERATION OF THE ISSUE ON PETITION 
FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
This Court has repeatedly expressed its concern over the 
increased use of habeas corpus writs as substitutes for timely appeal 
proceedings, See Brown v. Turner, 440 P.2d 968, 21 Utah 2d 96 (1968); 
Jaramillo v. Turner , 465 P.2d 343, 24 Utah 2d 19 (1970); 
Zumbrunnen v. Turner 497 P.2d 34, 27 Utah 2d 428 (1972). A substantial 
line of cases state quite clearly that matters which were known or 
should have been known by counsel and defendant at the time of trial 
should have been disposed of by the regular appellate procedure. 
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See Brown v. Turner, supra; Johnson v. Turner 473 P.2d 901, 24 Utah 
2d 439 (1970). This court has universally held that appeal is the 
regular procedure for review of injustices and irregularities in 
lower court proceedings. 
However, this Court has always recognized that writs of 
habeas corpus serve a valuable purpose and that they are both 
historically and presently integral to the protection of the rights 
of the citizenry. Thompson v. Harris, 144 P.2d 761, 107 Utah 
99 (1943), rehearing denied 152 P.2d 91, 107 Utah 99, certiorari denie 
65 S. Ct. 676, 324 U.S. 815, 89 L. Ed. 1406. The Court has also 
recognized valid exceptions to the above rules limiting habeas 
corpus following the appeal period. As the Court said in Johnson v. 
Turner, supra, at p. 904; 
"Where is appears that there has been such miscarriage of 
justice that it would be unconscionable not to re-examine 
a conviction, and that for some justifiable reason an appeal 
was not taken thereon, we do not regard rules of procedure 
as being so absolute as to prevent us from correcting any 
such obvious injustice.'1 
However, Appellant urges strenuously that the case at bar 
does not resemble the writs from persons incarcerated at the Utah 
State Prison which have been considered by this court in recent 
years. Appellants contention in this case is not that some minor 
infraction of her constitutional rights was perpetrated by the 
sentencing courts, but rather that under the principles articulated 
in the Shondel and Fair cases the courts below exceeded its 
jurisdiction in imposing a sentence of not to exceed five years in 
prison in each case, Consistent with the discussion of the Shondel 
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and Fair cases above, the sentencing court had no authority to 
sentence court had no authority to sentence either for a term in 
excess of one year or to the Utah State Prison. The sentence 
pronounced was void ab initio, at least to the extent that it 
exceeds the lawful bounds provided for a Class A misdemeanor, this 
defenct is rightfully subject to the collateral attack of a writ 
of habeas corpus at any time while she remains in prison in excess 
of the one year term. 
The central question in this case is whether the sentencing 
courts authority extended so far as to allow the court to assign 
an indeterminate term in prison to the petitioner. If, consonant 
with Shondel and Fair, supra, the court was obliged to sentence 
this offense as a Class A misdemeanor, than the passage of sentence 
as a felony was improper and not a legitimate exercise of judicial 
power. If the sentence was illegitimate at the outset, then surely 
the mere passage of time must not confer upon that sentence the patina 
of legitimacy. 
Courts have universally held that lack of jurisdiction is 
a proper area of collateral attack by writ of habeas corpus. 
Henry v. Henkel, 235 U.S. 219, 59 L. Ed. 203, 35 S. Ct. 54; 
Riggins. V. United States 199 U.S. 547, 50 L. Ed. 303, 26 S. Ct. 147 
Kelley v. Meyers, 124 Or. 322, 263 P.2d 903 further, the United States 
Supreme Court has stated that proceedings in excess of lawful authority 
are void and may be collaterally attacked as much as proceedings engaged 
upon entirely without authority. See Re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 9 S. Ct. 
672, 33 L. Ed. 118, Re Reed 100 U.S. B., 23 L. Ed. 538. 
Furthermore, it has been widely had that the jurisdiction 
of the court to make the particular order or judgment is a valid 
subject of inquiry for a collateral attack. As the Oregon Supreme 
Court had occasion to say in the case of Huffman v. Alexander, 
197 Or.283, 251 P.2a 87, rih den 197 Or. 331, 253 P.2d 289. (1952) 
at page 94 that ". . . circumstances may arise in connection with 
the criminal prosecution which will render the judgment void, even 
though the court had jurisdiction in the narrow sense, over person 
and subject matter at the inception of the proceedings." See also 
Ex Parte Cox 3 Idaho 530, 32 P. 197 (1893). 
The situation that obtains is that the sentencing judge 
sentenced in excess of their lawful authority. That sentence was 
void ab initio is appropriate for collateral attack. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons 'above stated, that the court below erred 
in dismissing the above entitled action, the appellant requests 
that the case be reversed and remanded for further action. 
Respecttulry Submitted, 
BRAD RICH 
Attorney for Appellant 
